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I. INTRODUCTION
Since human rights advocates resurrected the Alien Tort Claims Act
1
(ATCA) in 1980,2 the Act has generated endless controversy. Famously
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described by Judge Friendly as a "legal Lohengrin," 3 the resurrection of the
ATCA spawned a heated historical debate among scholars, 4 which has
evolved into a high-stakes political and legal struggle between multinational
corporations and human rights activists. 5 In 2004, the Supreme Court
addressed some of the legal questions surrounding the ATCA by finding that
the statute was not merely jurisdictional but also provided a narrow cause of
action for violations of certain customary international laws. 6 But many
important questions regarding the scope of the ATCA were left unanswered,
and lower courts have struggled to fill in the gaps.
The greatest threat to ATCA claims, however, comes not from the
Judicial Branch, but rather from the Executive Branch. Since 2001, the Bush
Administration 7 has taken a new tack in an effort to undermine the ATCA: the
State Department has made repeated requests for courts to dismiss ATCA
claims under the political question doctrine, claiming the cases would
adversely affect U.S. foreign policy interests.
8
Executive Branch interference in foreign affairs law is not
unprecedented. Just thirty years ago, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act9 (FSIA) to limit such interference in cases involving foreign
states. The divergent tolerance for Executive Branch interference in ATCA
cases versus FSIA cases lacks an adequate rationale, but this disparity has
been overlooked in the debate over the ATCA. Through drawing a
comparison between the current environment in ATCA litigation and the pre-
FSIA environment for cases against foreign sovereigns, this Note argues that
the political question doctrine is inappropriately applied in most ATCA
claims, and that legislation should be enacted to reduce the influence of the
Executive Branch in judicial affairs.
This analysis proceeds in five parts. Part II sketches a brief history of the
FSIA and ATCA. Part III identifies the paradox created by the disparate
2. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. Int'l Inv. Trust v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[Ajlthough it has
been with us since the first Judiciary Act ... no one seems to know whence it came.").
4. For example, some scholars argued that the ATCA was merely jurisdictional, see, e.g.,
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article I1, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 646 (2002) (noting that
"the First Congress probably saw the [ATCA] ... as an implementation of Article Ill alienage
jurisdiction"), while others argued that the ATCA provided a cause of action to sue multinational
corporations for causing severe environmental damage abroad. See, e.g., Cyril Kormos et al., U.S.
Participation in International Environmental Law and Policy, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 661, 672
(2001) ("[T]he [ATCA]'s contribution to international environmental law and policy is to provide a
remedy for egregious environmental damage caused by private sector parties operating abroad.").
5. See, for example, Senator Feinstein's attempt to amend the ATCA in 2005, which was
quickly withdrawn after human rights advocates protested. See infra notes 186-87.
6. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); David D. Christensen, Note,
Corporate Liability for Overseas Human Rights Abuses: The Alien Tort Statute After Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1219, 1222-23 (2005) (noting that many questions regarding the
ATCA were left unanswered by the Sosa opinion).
7. References to the Bush Administration refer to the Administration of President George W.
Bush.
8. See infra Section III.B. As this Note is concerned primarily with how the ATCA concerns
U.S. foreign policy interests, I do not discuss ATCA cases brought against U.S. officials. See, e.g.,
Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave:
The Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 105, 111-13 (2005).
9. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1 1)(2000).
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treatment of the two statutes and asserts that the political question doctrine is
responsible for the disparity. Part IV revisits the motivations of Congress
when it passed the FSIA to illustrate why allowing invocation of the political
question doctrine is imprudent. Part V surveys previously offered solutions to
limit the application of the political question doctrine and discusses their
inadequacies, concluding that a legislative approach would be the most
effective solution. Finally, Part VI briefly outlines potential components of a
legislative solution.
II. HISTORY OF THE FSIAAND ATCA
A. FSIA
The history of the FSIA reflects an ebb and flow of deference afforded
to the Executive Branch by courts. Initially, courts dictated what immunity
foreign sovereigns would receive from lawsuits, regardless of the desires of
the Executive Branch. In time, though, courts acquiesced to the Executive
Branch's immunity requests and gave near-complete deference to the State
Department. Dissatisfied with such deference, Congress eventually enacted
the FSIA, which defined explicit criteria by which courts would determine
whether immunity from suit was warranted, thereby eliminating the Executive
Branch's influence.
1. Early History
Through the mid-twentieth century, foreign nations (sovereigns) were
granted absolute immunity, meaning that suits brought against them in U.S.
courts would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.' 0 The concept of absolute
immunity for sovereigns was found neither in the Constitution nor in statutes,
but rather was a judicially-crafted policy."' Absolute immunity's foundation
lies with The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,2 where the Supreme Court
contemplated whether it had jurisdiction over a French armed ship in a U.S.
port. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that while a nation's jurisdiction over its
own territory "is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself,"1 3 a
sovereign would enter foreign territory only if it possessed an express or
implied license of immunity from that country's jurisdiction. Without such
immunity, a sovereign "would degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing
[itself] ... within the jurisdiction of another.",,4 Lower courts and eventually
the Supreme Court adopted Marshall's language for the proposition that
io. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
II. The Court has explained that the concept of absolute immunity was premised on comity
with other nations. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). Generally,
absolute immunity conferred by courts on foreign sovereigns mirrored the immunity those courts
provided to domestic sovereigns. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND
THEIR CORPORATIONS 5 (2d ed. 2003).
12. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
13. Id. at 136.
14. Id. at 137.
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foreign sovereigns were entitled to absolute immunity. 15 In one case, the
Supreme Court even granted immunity to Italy when the State Department
had requested that immunity be denied. 16
2. Transition Years
As commerce between countries increased in the twentieth century, the
theory of absolute immunity came under attack. Countries began to
distinguish foreign sovereigns' public acts from an increasing number of
private commercial acts, 17 such as acts involving sovereign-owned merchant
vessels, is to ensure that all commercial actors were treated equally. In 1938,
the Supreme Court began to retreat from absolute sovereign immunity and
simultaneously increased its deference to the Executive Branch by declaring
that future grants of absolute immunity would be conditioned on the desires of
the Executive Branch. 19 By 1950, most countries had adopted a new
"restrictive theo" of immunity that removed sovereign immunity for
commercial acts, with the United States following suit in 1952 when a legal
advisor at the State Department, Jack Tate, wrote the now-famous "Tate
letter" that eschewed absolute sovereign immunity in favor of the restrictive
theory.2'
The decision of whether to grant sovereign immunity was now
22
completely vested in the Executive Branch. Typically, the State Department
would determine whether a foreign sovereign deserved immunity when
brought into a U.S. court.23 The State Department would make a "suggestion"
of immunity to the court, and the court would subsequently treat the State
Department recommendations as binding. 24 While the State Department
15. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros., 271 U.S. at 571; Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.2d 659
(2d. Cir. 1924); Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 83 N.E. 876 (Mass. 1908).
16. See Berizzi Bros., 271 U.S. 562; The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 479-80 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
17. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 11, at 4 (concluding that the distinction was first noted in
France and surrounding countries in the nineteenth century).
18. See Compania Naviera Vascongado v. The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485, 521 (Lord
Maugham) ("Half a century ago foreign Governments very seldom embarked in trade with ordinary
ships... but there has been a very large development of State-owned commercial ships since the Great
War, and the question whether the immunity should continue to be given to ordinary trading ships has
become acute."), cited in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 40-41 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY iii
(1963) (detailing sovereign immunity cases in foreign jurisdictions).
19. See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74
(1926); see also Exparte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-90 (1943).
20. See DELLAPENNA, supra note I], at 5.
21. Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952) ("The widespread and increasing
practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice
which will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts."),
reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976) (app. 2).
22. The broad deference afforded the Executive Branch in determining whether foreign
sovereigns were entitled to immunity had been outlined by the Supreme Court years earlier in Republic
of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-6 (1945), and ExPartePeru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1941).
23. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971);
Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir.
1961); Vicente v. Trinidad, 372 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); Chemical Nat'l Res., Inc. v.
Venezuela, 215 A.2d 864 (Pa. 1966).
24. See supra note 23; GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 201 (3d ed. 1996).
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represented that its immunity determinations resulted from objectively
applying the restrictive theory of immunity, in practice the determinations
were also driven by political and diplomatic considerations.25
3. Modern History
Congress eventually became dissatisfied with the State Department's
seemingly arbitrary application of the restrictive theory of immunity 26 and the
State Department acknowledged that it was failing to apply the restrictive
theory objectively.27 In response, Congress, with the endorsement of President
Ford, 8 codified the Tate letter in the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
which limits the deference afforded to the Executive Branch. The FSIA grants
jurisdiction and removes sovereign immunity for specific types of conduct by
foreign states.29 Most pertinent to this Note, the FSIA includes a commercial
activities exception that codifies the restrictive theory of immunity. Under the
commercial activities exception, the FSIA removes sovereign immunity for
any action resulting from: (1) "commercial activity carried on in the United
States by [a] foreign state;" (2) "an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;" or (3)
"an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States." 30 By placing the determination of sovereign31
immunity entirely within the Judicial Branch, Congress hoped to mitigate
the influence politics had on determinations of sovereignty.
32
While foreign sovereigns continue to enjoy a presumption of immunity
in U.S. courts, 33 two significant changes have taken place in the past century.
First, the United States, along with most other countries, adopted the
restrictive theory of immunity that removes sovereign immunity when
25. See Mark B. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States Courts 1976-
1986, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 20 (1986); DELLAPENNA, supra note 11, at 29. This will be
discussed further in Section IV.A.
26. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 11, at 29-30 ("Expediency, rather than principle, came to
shape the [State] Department's suggestions.").
27. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 35 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings] (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Department
of State Legal Advisor) (testifying that the State Department "has not always been able to resist the[]
pressures" to grant sovereign immunity).
28. See Statement on Signing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 3 PUB. PAPERS
2609 (Oct. 22, 1976).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l)-(7) (2000).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000). There continues to be disagreement over the meaning
of "direct effect." See Joseph F. Morrissey, Simplifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: If a
Sovereign Acts Like a Private Party, Treat It Like One, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 675, 683-96 (2005).
31. See Jeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in International
Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 2120, 2132-33 (1995) ("Importantly, courts have understood the Act
to end the State Department's authority to determine the extent of sovereign immunity in a particular
case, and to shift that responsibility entirely to the judiciary.").
32. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 9 (1976) ("A private party who deals with a foreign
government entity cannot be certain that his legal dispute with a foreign state will not be decided on the
basis of nonlegal considerations through the foreign government's intercession with the Department of
State.").
33. The FSIA provides exceptions to otherwise absolute immunity.
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sovereign states operate in a commercial capacity like other private actors.
Second, the United States aimed to isolate the determination of sovereign
immunity from political and diplomatic pressures by explicitly codifying
every exception to immunity and placing the determination squarely within
the power of the Judicial Branch.
B. A TCA
The history of the ATCA lies in contrast to the historical development of
the FSIA. Instead of insulating judicial decisions from the political branches,
ATCA claims have been increasingly subject to Executive Branch
interference. Determining which claims were cognizable under the ATCA was
historically the province of the Judicial Branch. Within the past six years,
however, courts have acquiesced to Executive Branch requests to dismiss
ATCA claims under the political question doctrine.
1. Early History
The early history of the ATCA provides few clues to Congress's intent
in passing the statute and the proper roles for the political and judicial
branches. The modem ATCA statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, closely resembles the
statute passed as part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789.34 The statute now
reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States." 35 Numerous scholars have searched
unsuccessfully through the journals of the Continental Congress 36 and the
commentary of our nation's founders in an attempt to derive the motivation of
the First Congress in passing the ATCA 37 and to determine what types of torts
the First Congress intended to cover under "the law of nations." 38 Instead,
given the paucity of legislative history, scholars have been forced to rely on
textual analysis39 and ATCA case law. In the 190-year period between the
34. The First Judiciary Act granted to federal courts "original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in
dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are
plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit
is brought, and a citizen of another State." Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789)).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
36. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response
to the "Originalists, " 19 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 221,226-27 (1996).
37. See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Modern Transnational
Enterprise: Deconstructing the Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 3, 11-12 (2003)
(citing commentators who assert various motivations for passage of the ATCA in 1789, ranging from
national security concerns to concerns about the U.S. economy).
38. See id. at 11 (noting that some scholars believe the purpose of the ATCA was to protect
public and private human rights abuses while others believe the ATCA was drafted to address a specific
maritime crime); see also James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, Lectures on Law (1791), reprinted in 3
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 70, 71 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ("The law of
nations, properly so called, is the law of states and sovereigns, obligatory upon them in the same
manner, and for the same reasons, as the law of nature is obligatory upon individuals.").
39. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004) ("Given the poverty of drafting
history, modem commentators have necessarily concentrated on the text [of the ATCA] .... ).
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statute's enactment in 1789 and 1980, when the modem history of the ATCA
began, the statute was invoked only twenty-one times 40 and courts found
jurisdiction under the ATCA in only three of those cases.4 1 As the Supreme
Court recently stated, "despite considerable scholarly attention, it is fair to say
that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended [in enacting the
ATCA] has proven elusive.,
42
2. Modern History
The modem history of the ATCA reflects an initial effort by courts to
expand the scope of the ATCA, only to recently reverse course by deferring to
the Bush Administration's efforts to undermine ATCA claims. In 1979, a
Paraguayan physician filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court
against a former government official of Paraguay, alleging that the official and
others had tortured and killed the physician's son in Paraguay because of the
physician's political beliefs.43 The Second Circuit, undeterred by the rarely
invoked ATCA, held that torture was a violation of the law of nations and was
thus actionable under the ATCA. In 1995, the Second Circuit held that the
ATCA applied not only to public officials, but to private actors as well. In
Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit confronted claims of rape, forced
prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, assault, battery, summary
execution, and wrongful death allegedly perpetrated by Bosnian-Serb military
forces during the Bosnia-Herzegovina civil war.44 While Karadzic proclaimed
himself to be the President of Srpska, a Bosnian-Serb republic within the
country, the district court concluded that Karadzic's faction did "not
constitute a recognized state" and its members did "not operate under the
color of any recognized state law.''46 Without reaching the question of whether
Karadzic operated under the color of another state's law,47 the Second Circuit
held that "certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals., 48 Such conduct includes piracy, genocide, and war crimes.
49
40. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1,4 n. 15 (1985) (listing the twenty-one cases).
41. See Dhooge, supra note 37, at 12-13 (discussing the three cases).
42. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718-19.
43. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 (1991) (emphasizing Filartiga's
importance by analogizing it to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
44. 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995).
45. Id. at 237.
46. Id. at 237-38 (quoting Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
47. Violations of the law of nations have traditionally required action under the color of state
law. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792-93 & 814 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
48. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40. The Second Circuit found support for this proposition by
examining the historical prohibition against piracy. See, e.g., I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1798) (early
opinion by an Attorney General regarding American citizens aiding the French fleet to plunder British
property off the coast of Sierra Leone in 1795). Similarly, the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States proclaimed that "[ilndividuals may be held liable for offenses against international
law, such as piracy, war crimes, or genocide." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES pt. II, introductory note (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
49. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, pt. II, introductory note.
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Following Kadic, the number of ATCA claims grew dramatically. 50
ATCA claimants alleged either that the defendants had operated under the
color of state law51 or that the offense was of such a nature that a private actor
violated the law of nations without operating under the color of state law.52 In
addition, corporations were targeted for committing actionable torts in concert
with states.5T Expanding the scope of the ATCA to cover private citizens and
corporations predictably drew strong criticism from scholars 54 and
businesspeople. 55 In 2004, ATCA claims were placed in jeopardy when the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain56 to determine,
in part, whether the ATCA provided a cause of action or was solely
jurisdictional.57 The Bush Administration argued strenuously that the ATCA
should not be read to provide a cause of action. 58 The Court, however,
disagreed and held that "although the [ATCA] is a jurisdictional statute ...
50. Between 1980 and 1995, approximately twenty cases, leading to decisions available
online, alleged jurisdiction under the ATCA. Between 1995 and 2003 (roughly half the time), the
number of claims more than doubled to forty-one. See Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation
Under the A TCA as a Proxy for Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HuM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1, 9 & n.40
(2003) (listing all ATCA claims between 1980 and 2003). Many ATCA claims, however, were
dismissed at initial stages for failing to state a cognizable claim under ATCA or for failing to allege
sufficient facts to support an ATCA claim. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d
Cir. 2003); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Maugein v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Colo. 2004).
51. The claim was that the defendants had operated in this manner as a state actor or in
concert with the state. See, e.g., Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Courts have
analogized acting in concert with the state to the "color of law" jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000). See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 ("A private individual acts under color of law within the meaning of
section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid.") (citing Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
52. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
53. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding at the
summary judgment stage that colorable evidence existed to find that Unocal aided and abetted the
Burmese government in the forced labor of Burmese citizens). The Unocal case was subsequently
dismissed after a settlement was reached. See Marc Lifsher, Unocal Settles Human Rights Lawsuit Over
Alleged Abuses at Myanmar Pipeline; A Deal Ends a Landmark Case Brought by Villagers who Said
Soldiers Committed Atrocities, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at Cl; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708
(9th Cir. 2005) (dismissing the case after a settlement was reached).
54. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 4, at 647 ("If nothing else, courts may find that the original
history of the Alien Tort Statute provides a basis for judicial restraint in the face of ever-expanding
claims about the Statute's scope."); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS,
AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 1 (2003) (describing a "nightmare
scenario" where "100,000 class action Chinese plaintiffs, organized by New York trial lawyers, could
sue General Motors, Toyota, . . . and 20 other blue-chip corporations in federal court for abetting
China's denial of political rights, for observing China's restrictions on trade unions, and for impairing
the Chinese environment.").
55. See John E. Howard, Vice President of International Policy and Programs, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, Op-Ed., The Alien Tort Claims Act: Is Our Litigation-Run-Amok Going Global? (Oct.
2002), http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/02I0howarditigation.htm.
56. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
57. See David G. Savage, Foreign Abduction Case Goes to Court: The Justices Today Will
Consider Whether a 1789 Law Allows Victims of Human Rights Abuses Overseas To File Lawsuits in
U.S. Courtrooms, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A10.
58. See Brief for United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 6, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 182581 ("The Ninth Circuit erred . . . in
concluding that Section 1350 is anything other than a grant of jurisdiction. By its terms, Section 1350
simply confers jurisdiction on the federal courts over a specified class of cases. It does not expressly
confer any private right of action, it contains no language from which it might be possible to infer a
private right, and, in particular, it lacks the 'rights-creating language' that is 'critical' to the creation of a
private right of action.").
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[it] is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common
law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international
law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time. 59 While the
Court concluded that the common law could evolve to incorporate modem
violations of the laws of nations, it constrained the expansion of ATCA claims
by noting that "federal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted., 60 In Sosa, the Court addressed
some foundational concerns regarding the ATCA but left many key questions
unanswered, such as whether private individuals and corporations could be
held liable under the ATCA.6 '
3. Developments Under the Bush Administration
Although the Court ruled against the Bush Administration's request to
read the ATCA solely as a jurisdictional statute, the Administration had
alreadyZ developed a new strategy for defeating ATCA claims. Beginning in
2001, 62 the Bush Administration claimed that adjudicating ATCA claims
interfered with U.S. foreign policy interests and the claims should therefore be
dismissed under the political question doctrine-a judicially-created doctrine
by which a court will dismiss a case if it involves a question more
• . 63
appropriately addressed by a political branch. This represented a dramatic
shift from past Republican and Democratic administrations. 64 Rather than
finding that the political question doctrine was inapplicable to ATCA claims
or that the Executive Branch was inappropriately interfering with judicial
affairs, lower courts have deferred to the Executive Branch and therefore
dismissed ATCA claims.65 As a result, the Executive Branch has been able to
effectively grant immunity to ATCA defendants in U.S. courts. Such grants of
immunity are especially troubling when conferred upon private individuals
and corporations for claims resulting from commercial activity. When
compared to the instances where immunity is granted in FSIA litigation, one
observes a rather odd paradox.
59. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
60. Id. at 732 (noting that this limitation is consistent with the Second Circuit's opinion in
Filartiga and Judge Edwards concurring opinion in Tel-Oren).
61. Id. at 732 n.20.
62. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1118, 1208-09 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev'd,
456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissing ATCA claim on political question grounds following a
Statement of Interest filed by the U.S. State Department in 2001).
63. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (noting that foreign affairs issues "frequently
turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably
committed to the executive or legislature"); see also infra Section III.A.
64. While past Republican administrations argued for a narrow reading of the ATCA, no
administration had argued that cases should be dismissed under the political question doctrine. See Brian
C. Free, Comment, Awaiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.: Advocating the Cautious Use of Executive
Opinions in Alien Tort Claims Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 467,474-76 (2003).
65. See, e.g., Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1118; Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F.
Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S.Ct. 1418 (2006).
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III. IDENTIFYING THE PARADOX AND ITS CAUSE
A. Identifying the Paradox
The treatment of foreign states under the FSIA and the treatment of
private actors under the ATCA appear oddly inconsistent. While foreign states
continue to enjoy a presumption of immunity, that immunity is removed in
U.S. courts when claims arise from a state's "commercial activity," such as a
breach of contract. To obtain jurisdiction, a U.S. court need only determine
that the commercial activity had a direct effect in the United States, not that
the violative act itself occurred in the United States.66 In one example, two
Panamanian corporations and a Swiss Bank brought a FSIA action in a U.S.
court against Argentina for defaulting on a bond payment that was to be made
to a bank account in New York.67 The Supreme Court held that New York
being the "place of performance" for the contract was sufficient to remove
Argentina's sovereign immunity protections.
68
In contrast, private actors, including U.S. corporations, facing ATCA
claims for violating the law of nations have been granted effective immunity
69by having their cases dismissed under the political question doctrine. This is
surprising for three reasons. First, private actors, unlike foreign sovereigns,
have no historical entitlement to immunity for their actions and do not start
with a presumption of immunity. 70 Second, unlike relatively less egregious
commercial claims, violations of the law of nations are a narrow set of claims
that encompass appalling conduct, such as war crimes, genocide, and slavery.
One would expect violators of the law of nations to face greater accountability
than those who breach a commercial contract. Finally, many ATCA
defendants are either U.S. coTorations or foreign corporations with bases of
operation in the United States. Again, one would expect the United States to
be equally, if not more, interested in regulating the behavior of companies
operating within its own borders than regulating the behavior of a foreign
sovereign.
Some may claim this is not a paradox at all by arguing that FSIA claims
involve activity occurring in the United States or having a direct effect in the
United States. ATCA claims, on the other hand, typically involve activity
occurring abroad. One may assert that the United States should be more
concerned with conduct directly affecting the United States than conduct
occurring abroad. The underlying statutes providing the causes of action,
however, make no such distinction. In granting U.S. courts jurisdiction over
FSIA and ATCA claims, Congress gave no indication that valid claims
involving foreign conduct should be pursued any less vigorously than those
inside the United States. To the contrary, the United States has long aimed to
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000).
67. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
68. Id. at 617-19.
69. See supra note 65.
70. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 79 FoREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 102, 107 ("corporations do not have sovereign immunity").
71. See, e.g., Sarci v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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regulate the conduct of its citizens abroad.72 The distinction between domestic
and foreign activities is therefore a red herring and fails to explain the
disparity in immunity provided to ATCA and FSIA defendants.
B. Explaining the Paradox
The effective immunity granted to ATCA defendants is a direct result of
a policy change by the Bush Administration. Certain previous administrations
have viewed the ATCA less favorably than others, 73 but the Bush
Administration has taken a more active role in asking courts to dismiss ATCA
claims than any past president. The strategy for requesting that a court dismiss
a claim is to assert that a given ATCA suit will harm the foreign relations of
the United States, as determined by the President, and that the court should
dismiss the claim under the political question doctrine. 74 While past
administrations have invoked the political question doctrine in cases that
implicate treaties signed by the United States,75 the Bush Administration has
invoked the political question doctrine in ATCA cases where treaties are not76
implicated and only a general foreign policy interest exists. Historically,
courts have not dismissed such cases,77 but surprisingly, in response to this
unprecedented assertion of the political question doctrine, most courts have
acquiesced with near-complete deference to the Executive Branch.78 The
result is that since 2001, multiple ATCA claims have been dismissed under
the political question doctrine, providing effective immunity to the defendants
in U.S. courts. This Section will summarize how the political question
doctrine is invoked followed by examples of ATCA cases that reflect the
recent policy change.
1. Explanation of Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine evokes substantial debate among
scholars, 79 especially within the context of foreign affairs. Proponents of the
72. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (Supp. 2006) (subjecting U.S. citizens who engage in illicit
sexual conduct abroad to up to thirty years in prison); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2
(2000) (prohibiting corporations and their employees from bribing foreign officials).
73. See Free, supra note 64, at 474-75.
74. The views of the Executive Branch are typically expressed through a Statement of Interest
submitted by the U.S. State Department to the relevant court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-517. See,
e.g., Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
75. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 305 F.3d 1249, 1251-52 & n.4 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (reviewing Statement of Interest filed in 1998 that referenced U.S. obligations under the Vienna
Convention); Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634, 642 (4th Cir.
2000) (reviewing Statement of Interest filed in 1998 that references U.S. obligations under a Treaty of
Friendship and General Relations between the United States and Spain).
76. See infra Section III.B.
77. See Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and
Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 433, 457-63 (2002) (offering examples of cases where "U.S.
citizens and foreigners forced the judiciary to consider one of the most controversial issues of our
foreign and domestic policy").
78. See infra Section IIIB.
79. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.8.1, at 128
(2d ed. 2002) ("In many ways, the political question doctrine is the most confusing of the justiciability
doctrines.").
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doctrine find its foundation in Marbury v. Madison,80 when Justice Marshall
wrote:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience....
The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of congress for
establishing the department of foreign affairs. ... The acts of such an officer, as an
officer, can never be examinable by the courts.5 '
Since Marbury, numerous cases have contained references to the
82 8Executive Branch's unique role in foreign policy. In Baker v. Carr,83 the
Court identified six factors indicating whether a case involved a political
question and stated that if any of the factors were "inextricable" from the case,
the court should dismiss the case on political question grounds. 84 The last
three factors are particularly relevant to ATCA claims: "the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question."
85
Scholars critical of courts dismissing ATCA claims under the political
question doctrine assert three primary objections. First, the political question
doctrine is "an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of several established
doctrines that has misled lawyers and courts to find in it things that were never
put there and make it far more than the sum of its parts." 86 Second, they argue
that courts should defer on political question grounds only when reviewing
actions that the Constitution commits to a political branch, such as the
President's prerogative to recognize foreign governments. 87 Finally, in a
80. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
81. Id. at 165-66.
82. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (noting that cases involving foreign
affairs "frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion
demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature"); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (finding that the Executive Branch decisions regarding foreign
affairs "are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility
and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion
or inquiry"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp. 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (noting the
"exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations"). But see THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/ JUDICIAL ANSWERS 19
(1992) ("It is particularly odd that several of the most redolent dicta seemingly making the political
question doctrine mandatory in foreign-relations cases are not merely substantively irrelevant to the
cases in which they originate but that those cases often repeal the application of the political-question
doctrine to various other, domestic issues.").
83. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
84. Id. at 217.
85. Id.
86. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question " Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597, 622 (1976);
see also John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1379, 1407 (1988) ("[lit's not even clear that it is a 'doctrine': even in its heyday it was never more than
a congeries of excuses for not deciding issues otherwise properly before the court.").
87. Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine, " and Foreign
Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135, 1156 (1970) ("The statement 'this is a political question and the
Court will not upset the Executive's determination' is no different analytically from the statement 'this
is a question arising under the commerce clause and the congressional enactment before us was within
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related criticism, some scholars contend that ATCA claims should be spared
from the political question doctrine since the doctrine does not justify judicial
abstention in interpreting statutes, even if the statute implicates foreign
policy. 88 In spite of these criticisms, U.S. courts, since 2001, have dismissed
ATCA claims under the political question doctrine at the behest of the
Executive Branch.
2. The Political Question Doctrine in Practice
Two factors are responsible for courts' dismissals of ATCA claims by
invoking the political question doctrine. First, the Bush Administration has
asserted the political question doctrine in ATCA cases when past
administrations had not. Second, courts typically accept the Executive
Branch's request for dismissal on political question grounds without further
inquiry.
Prior to 2002, an ATCA case had never been dismissed on political
question grounds. 8 9 In fact, prior to 2001,90 no administration had ever
requested that ATCA claims be dismissed on political question grounds.
91
Certain administrations had even been supportive of ATCA claims. The
Carter Administration filed a memorandum in the Filartiga case in response
to a request from the Second Circuit. The memo, signed jointly by the State
and Justice Departments, expressed clear support for the ATCA, stating that
once a valid cause of action exists, "there is little danger that judicial
enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts. To the contrary, a refusal
to recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously
damage the credibility of our nation's commitment to the protection of human
rights."' 92 In Kadic, the Clinton Administration, when asked by the court,
responded that the case raised no political questions, 93 even though the
the power of Congress to pass."); see also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION 219-220 (1990) (arguing that the Court has applied the political question doctrine in
interpreting the Constitutional powers of political branches, not in abdicating its responsibility.).
88. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) ("[O]ne of the
Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely
because our decision may have significant political overtones [bearing on American relations with
Japan]."); BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS 143 (1996) ("[I]f the courts were to apply the political question doctrine to suits under § 1350..
. the statute[] would be [a] nullit[y]; [its] very essence is that [it] concem[s] activities by officials in
foreign countries."); see also KOH, supra note 87, at 220 (asserting that even proponents of a broader
political question doctrine would concede that "the courts have a special duty to look closely when
executive conduct in foreign affairs infringes directly upon individual rights").
89. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 88, at 141 (noting that no ATCA suit had ever been
dismissed under the political question doctrine); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1208-09
(C.D. Cal. 2002), rev'd, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissing ATCA claims based on political
question doctrine).
90. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1181 (Statement of Interest filed on Nov. 5,2001).
91. Free, supra note 64, at 475-76 ("The George W. Bush Administration has fundamentally
shifted the executive position concerning § 1350 litigation, contending that general foreign policy
concerns should prevent federal court adjudication of human rights cases.").
92. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 1980 WL 340146, reprinted in David Cole et al., Interpreting the
Alien Tort Statute: Amicus Curiae Memorandum of International Law Scholars and Practitioners in
Trajano v. Marcos, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 34-47 (1988).
93. 70 F.3d 232, 250 (1995).
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defendant was in the midst of negotiating an end to the region's civil war.94
While the Reagan Administration opposed an ATCA claim brought against
Ferdinand Marcos, it asserted that the ATCA's jurisdiction should be read
more narrowly, 95 not that dismissal was justified on political question
grounds.
Since 2001, however, the Bush Administration has submitted numerous
Statements of Interest requesting that courts find ATCA claims non-justiciable
under the political question doctrine. These requests may be divided into two
basic categories: cases involving private actors as defendants, and cases
involving public officials as defendants. The relevance of this distinction will
be discussed further in Part V. With respect to private actors, the first case
dismissing an ATCA claim on political question grounds was Sarei v. Rio
Tinto PLC, involving the British mining company, Rio Tinto, which had
processing plants in the United States and had opened a copper mine in the
Bougainville region of Papua New Guinea. 96 The plaintiffs alleged that Rio
Tinto conspired with the Papua New Guinea government to commit war
crimes during a ten-year insurrection sparked by the mine's operations.
97
After denying the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, 98 the court turned to the Statement
of Interest it had received in November 2001 from the Attorney General (on
behalf of the State Department). 99 In the Statement, the Administration
asserted "that continued adjudication of this lawsuit 'would risk a potentially
serious adverse impact on the [Bougainville] peace process, and hence on the
conduct of [United States] foreign relations."' 10 0 In response, the plaintiffs
introduced statements by negotiators to the Bougainville Peace Agreement
which claimed that the litigation "has not affected, and will not disturb, the
peace negotiations." 10 1 The court made clear, however, that the Statement of
Interest controlled: "[T]he court must accept the statement of foreign policy
provided by the executive branch as conclusive of its view of that subject; it
may not assess whether the policy articulated is wise or unwise, or whether it
is based on misinformation or faulty reasoning."' 0 2 As a result, the court held
"that all claims must be dismissed on the basis of the political question
94. Elaine Sciolino, Sarajevo Pact: Diplomacy on a Roll, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at A8
(reporting on Mr. Karadzic, among others, signing an agreement to lift the siege on Sarajevo
approximately one month before the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion).
95. STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 88, at 19 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae at 9-10, 15, 26-27, Trajano v. Marcos, Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039, 1989 WL 76894 (9th Cir. 1989)
(mem.)).
96. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev'd, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). While
the Ninth Circuit recently reversed the lower court's dismissal on political question grounds, the court
relied heavily on the fact that the State Department did not explicitly request that the court dismiss the
case on political question grounds rather than holding that the political question doctrine was generally
inapplicable. 456 F.3d at 1082-83.
97. Id. at 1127-29.
98. Id. at 1208. But see id. (granting the motion to dismiss with regard to environmental
claims).
99. The Statement of Interest was submitted in response to a request from the court. See id. at
1180-81.
100. Id. at 1181 (citing the Statement of Interest) (alteration in original).
1O1. Id.
102. Id. at 1181-82.
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doctrine."'0 3 Under the court's logic, the President would be able to extinguish
almost any claim before a U.S. court by simply asserting that the claim would
detrimentally affect U.S. foreign policy since the court apparently would be
unable to question such an assertion.
In a more recent case against an American oil company, Occidental
Petroleum, Colombian citizens alleged that Occidental provided financial
assistance to the Colombian military in exchange for protection from left-wing
guerrillas. 0 4 According to the plaintiffs, on one occasion, Occidental assisted
the Colombian Army during a bombing raid of the town of Santo Domingo
where they knowingly attacked civilians.'0 5 The citizens of Santo Domingo
brought an ATCA claim against Occidental for war crimes, extrajudicial
killing, torture, and crimes against humanity, and the court denied
Occidental's motion to dismiss the claims.' 0 6 The State Department filed a
Statement of Interest in which it "expressed its view that this litigation would
interfere with its approach to encouraging the protection of human rights in
Colombia." 107 Applying the Baker test, the court held that "two [of the
factors]-lack of respect for coordinate branches and adherence to a policy
decision-apply. Thus the Court dismisses the instant action as raising a non-
justiciable political question."' 0 8 As a consequence of finding the claim non-
justiciable due to the Administration's generalized foreign policy concerns, a
U.S. corporation was effectively granted immunity after allegedly violating
the law of nations.' 
09
The second class of cases involves defendants who are public officials.
In a recent D.C. Circuit case, the court considered an ATCA suit brought
against the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs by Chinese, Taiwanese,
South Korean, and Filipina women who were subjected to sexual slavery and
torture by Japan during World War 11.110 The United States filed a Statement
of Interest asking the court to find the claim non-justiciable since "judicial
intrusion into the relations between Japan and other foreign governments
would impinge upon the ability of the President to conduct the foreign
relations of the United States.'' 11 The court considered the political question
doctrine and noted the peace treaties that had been signed by the countries in
the region following the end of World War II. The court concluded that
"adjudication by a domestic court not only 'would undo' a settled foreign
103. Id. at 1208-09. The court reached this conclusion after applying the Baker test. See id. at
1194-99; see also supra note 96.
104. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168-69 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
105. Id. at 1168.
106. Id. at 1183.
107. Id. at 1194 ("Notably, the State Department apparently agrees with Plaintiffs that a wrong
has occurred: 'On January 3, 2003, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota informed the Colombian government of
the U.S. decision to suspend assistance to CACOM-I, the Colombian Air Force unit involved in the
Santo Domingo incident."') (citing the Statement of Interest).
108. Id. at 1195.
109. In certain cases, the administration requested that the court dismiss the case on political
question grounds, but the court instead dismissed the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005); In re South African Apartheid
Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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policy of state-to-state negotiation with Japan, but also could disrupt Japan's
'delicate' relations with China and Korea, thereby creating 'serious
implications for stability in the region."' 112 While the court accepted the
government's request for judicial abstention, it did so only after considering
the persuasiveness of the government's argument. 113 Another recent ATCA
case brought against a public official involves Falun Gong members suing a
former mayor of Beijing and a former Deputy Provincial Governor for torture
and arbitrary detention.l m4 The Administration again submitted a Statement of
Interest encouraging the court to find the case non-justiciable since U.S.
courts sitting "'in judgment on the acts of foreign officials taken within their
own countries pursuant to their government's policy... can serve to detract
from, or interfere with, the Executive Branch's conduct of foreign policy."'115
In the end, the court found an intermediate solution by granting a declaratory
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs but refusing to grant damages or injunctive
relief.' 16
One case stands out as a clear exception to the deference typically
afforded to the Executive Branch's requests since the court refused to concede
to the Administration's request to find an ATCA claim non-justiciable. 1 7 In
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., a district court
reviewed an ATCA claim brought by Sudanese citizens claiming that
Talisman, a Canadian energy company with a subsidiary in the United States,
"collaborated with Sudan in 'ethnically cleansing' civilian populations
surrounding oil concessions located in southern Sudan in order to facilitate oil
exploration and extraction activities." 118 The State Department submitted a
Statement of Interest,' 19 in part stating that "'when the government in question
protests that the U.S. proceeding interferes with the conduct of its foreign
policy in pursuit of goals that the United States shares, we believe that
considerations of international comity and judicial abstention may properly
come into play."" 120 Attached to the Statement of Interest was a letter from the
Canadian government asking for the court to abstain. 121 The court
distinguished the Statement of Interest from those provided in earlier cases by
noting that the Administration "has not advised this Court that the
continuation of this lawsuit will adversely affect the Government's relations
112. Id. at 52 (quoting the Statement of Interest).
113. Id.
114. Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
115. Id. at 1271 (quoting the Statement of Interest).
116. The court did not invoke the political question doctrine but found the acts were sanctioned
by the Chinese government and were subject to the Act of State doctrine, which precludes damages and
injunctive relief. See id. at 1306, 1311.
117. The court in Doe v. Liu Qi noted that it had not found "a single case in which a court
permitted a lawsuit to proceed in the face of an expression of concern such as that communicated by the
State Department here." Id. at 1298.
118. 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882 (DLC), 2004 WL 1920978, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004) (mem.).
119. Although the court referred to the State Department's submission as a "State letter," to be
consistent, I refer to it as a Statement of Interest.
120. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882 (DLC), 2005
WL 2082846, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (quoting the Statement of Interest).
121. Id. at *1.
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with Canada or threaten the goal of achieving peace in Sudan."' 22 Despite the
request of Canada and the Department of State, the court retained jurisdiction,
finding that "dismissal is only warranted . . . where the nexus between the
lawsuit and that foreign policy is sufficiently apparent and the importance of
the relevant foreign policy outweighs the public's interest in vindicating the
values advanced by the lawsuit."
123
An examination of ATCA cases since Filartiga shows a dramatic
change in the Executive Branch's policy toward ATCA claims beginning in
2001. Courts have deferred to the Executive Branch's requests to abstain from
ATCA claims with varying degrees but most courts bow to the Executive
Branch's request with little examination of the asserted foreign policy interest.
The next Part discusses how this variable application of the political question
doctrine is similar to the application of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity prior to the enactment of the FSIA.
IV. AN OLD PROBLEM RETURNS
As Part III established, the Bush Administration has recently introduced
the political question doctrine into ATCA jurisprudence. This politicization of
ATCA litigation has come in two forms. First, the Executive Branch faces
political pressure from foreign countries and U.S. corporations to ask courts to
abstain from hearing ATCA cases. Second, Executive Branch requests for
judicial abstention reflect a political branch's power over legal claims. These
problems are not novel. Just thirty years ago, Congress faced the same
concerns about the application of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
prior to the enactment of the FSIA. As one FSIA drafter stated, a "primary
objective" of the FSIA was: "to depoliticise sovereign immunity cases by
transferring determinations of sovereign immunity from the State Department
to the courts ... ,124 This Part asserts that the concerns of Congress prior to
enacting the FSIA are analogous to the current concerns about the ATCA.
As discussed in Part II, in the period between 1952, when the State
Department announced it would enforce the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, and 1976, when Congress passed the FSIA, the Executive Branch
instructed courts to grant or deny foreign sovereign immunity requests. 125 The
State Department even set up a "quasi-judicial process through which foreign
governments could petition for immunity. 126 In advocating for the passage of
the FSIA, the State and Justice Departments voiced two concerns related to
the politicization of the determination of sovereign immunity. First, foreign
governments were placing pressure on the State Department to request
122. Id. at *6.
123. Id. at *7, The court, however, later granted summary judgment to the defendants on the
merits of the claim. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882
(DLC), 2006 WL 2602145 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2006).
124. Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in
Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 304-05 (1986).
125. See supra notes 22-25.
126. See George Kahale, III, & Matias A. Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform
Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211,215 (1979).
2007]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:191
immunity on their behalf.127 Second, the State Department was being placed
in a position of deciding issues of law.' 28 These concerns will be evaluated in
turn.
A. Pressure from Foreign Governments
Eliminating the pressure that foreign governments exerted on the State
Department was a key goal of the FSIA. 129 During Congressional hearings
leading up to the passage of the FSIA, the Acting Legal Advisor to the State
Department wrote that in the period from 1960 to 1972, the State Department
had received forty-eight requests from foreign governments asking that the
State Department request immunity on the country's behalf. 130 At a later
hearing, the Legal Adviser at the State Department was surprisingly
forthcoming when he testified that when faced with pressure from a foreign
government, "we would hope that in most cases we would be able to resist
this, but in practice I would have to say to you in candor that the State
Department, being a political institution, has not always been able to resist
these pressures."' 3 1 Evidence of political pressure was also apparent from the
inconsistent application of the restrictive theory of immunity by the State
Department.132
Although the current Administration has not complained of foreign
countries exerting pressure on the State Department over ATCA litigation,
there are indications that such pressure exists. In two ATCA cases previously
discussed, Talisman Energy, Inc. and Liu Qi, the foreign governments filed
Statements of Interest along with the United States. In Talisman Energy, Inc.,
the Canadian government filed a Statement of Interest on behalf of an energy
company headquartered in Canada.' 33 The court noticed that the Statement of
Interest submitted by the State Department was not as strongly worded as in
other cases and did not take a position on the merits of the litigation.' 34 While
127. See Immunities of Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims
and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 34 (1973) [hereinafter 1973
Hearings] (Letter from Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst and Secretary of State William P.
Rogers to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1973) ("The transfer of this function to
the courts will also free the Department [of State] from pressures by foreign states to suggest immunity
and from any adverse consequences resulting from the unwillingness of the Department to suggest
immunity.")).
128. Id. ("[I]t is not satisfactory that a department, acting through administrative procedures,
should in the generality of cases determine whether the plaintiff will or will not be permitted to pursue
his cause of action.").
129. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976) ("Although the State Department espouses the
restrictive principle of immunity, the foreign state may attempt to bring diplomatic influences to bear
upon the State Department's determination.").
130. 1973 Hearings, supra note 127, at 49 (Letter from Charles N. Brower to Congressman
Donohue (July 24, 1973)).
131. 1976 Hearings, supra note 27, at 35 (Testimony of Monroe Leigh) (stating further that
"this consideration of political factors is, in fact, the very antithesis of the rule of law which we would
like to see established").
132. See Jet Line Servs., Inc. v. MV Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1169 (D. Md. 1978)
(citing to pre-FSIA cases inconsistent with the restrictive theory of immunity); Kahale & Vega, supra
note 126, at 216 & n.30.
133. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882 (DLC),
2005 WL 2082846, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005).
134. See id. at *2, *6-*7.
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the State Department may have preferred to not take a position at all, the
Department may have felt compelled to submit a half-hearted Statement of
Interest given the United States's close relationship with Canada. Similarly, it
is doubtful that the State Department could ignore the forceful Statement of
Interest China submitted in a case brought against Chinese public officials. In
Liu Qi, the court noted that China's Statement of Interest "concludes with a
reiteration of the detrimental effects of adjudication on the common interests
of the two nations." ' 3 5 In a third case, Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., the
Department of State attached a letter from the Indonesian ambassador to the
United States with its Statement of Interest.' 36 The State Department made
clear that questioning the conduct of Indonesia's military (even though they
were not named defendants in the suit) "would in fact risk a potentially
serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United States, including
interests related directly to the on-going struggle against international
terrorism."' 37 Given that the defendant-countries in these three cases voiced
strong opposition to U.S. courts hearing the claims, it seems likely that the
pressure exerted on the State Department by foreign governments in ATCA
suits is comparable to the pressure faced prior to the FSIA.
Compounding the pressure exerted by foreign governments, the U.S.
government must also endure strong lobbying from corporations facing
liability from ATCA claims. More generally, the U.S. business community
has long been an opponent of the ATCA. The opposition has been led by the
National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
U.S. Council of International Business, and the International Chamber of
Commerce.' 38 Some opponents in the corporate community have used rather
alarmist rhetoric to galvanize opposition to the ATCA. In 2002, the Vice
President of International Policy and Programs at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce wrote an article asking rhetorically: "Did you know that, under
current U.S. law, foreigners could sue your company in U.S. courts-if you
simply did business, paid taxes and complied with the laws of a foreign
country in which those foreigners allege that an atrocity occurred?"' 139 Another
book predicted that ATCA "litigation could diminish US merchandise trade
(imports plus exports) by $50 to $60 billion with the target countries." 14' In
response to the ATCA, a variety of strategies have emerged to help
corporations avoid liability under the ATCA. These include lobbying the
President and Congress to amend the ATCA to make it solely jurisdictional,' 4'
encouraging defendants to consider a political question doctrine defense when
135. Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
136. 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2005).
137. Id.
138. See Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response to
Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 7 (2004).
139. Howard, supra note 55. Of course, no such claim has ever been upheld in a U.S. court.
140. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 54, at 38. The authors identified "target
countries" based on the country's human rights record and political and economic freedom. See id. at
13-36.
141. See Daniel T. Griswold, USA Engage, Abuse of 18th Century Law Threatens U.S.
Economic and Security Interests (Jan. 25, 2003), http://www.usaengage.org/legislative/2003/alientort/
cato-griswold.html.
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faced with an ATCA suit, 142 and requesting a "generic letter from the
executive branch asserting that any judicial involvement in such disputes
would interfere with U.S. foreign policy-making."' 143 All of these strategies
involve pressuring the Executive Branch to help corporate defendants achieve
a favorable outcome. Given the strong influence business leaders have over
U.S. foreign policy, 144 this lobbying effort may prove even more powerful
than that engaged in by foreign countries.
B. Political Branch Answering Legal Questions
Another aspect of depoliticizing restrictive immunity determinations was
to limit the ability of the Executive Branch to make legal determinations. As
one State Department legal adviser stated, the FSIA "would eliminate our
peculiar and, in my view, outdated practice of having a political institution,
namely, the State Department, decide many of these questions of law.', 145 In
passing the FSIA, Congress stated that "a principal purpose" of the bill was to
"assur[e] litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal
grounds and under procedures that insure due process."' 146 This comports with
a fundamental tenet of our judicial system that political actors should not be
making legal determinations.
147
While most Executive Branch intervention in ATCA cases has focused
on foreign policy concerns and not legal determinations, 148 there are instances
where the Executive Branch has attempted to thrust a legal determination on
the court. In the case brought by Falun Gong followers against Chinese
officials, the court faced the question of whether the acts of the officials
constituted official state acts, thereby triggering the Act of State doctrine. 
149
The United States, in its Statement of Interest, attempted to provide an answer
when it warned that "'U.S. courts should be cautious when asked to sit in
judgment on the acts of foreign officials taken within their own countries
pursuant to their government's policy." ' 150 The court agreed, concluding that
the Chinese government's "alleged repression of the Falun Gong movement
and violation of the international human rights of Falun Gong practitioners
142. See Richard T. Marooney & George S. Branch, Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act: United States Court Jurisdiction over Torts, 12 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 3, i1 (2003).
143. Kenny Bruno, De-Globalizing Justice: The Corporate Campaign To Strip Foreign Victims
of Corporate-Induced Human Rights Violations of the Right To Sue in U.S. Courts, MULTINAT'L
MONITOR, Mar. 1, 2003, at 13.
144. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 107, 120 (2005) (concluding after an empirical analysis that "internationally oriented
business leaders exercise strong, consistent, and perhaps lopsided influence on the makers of U.S.
foreign policy").
145. 1976 Hearings, supra note 27, at 25.
146. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 9 (1976).
147. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is.")
148. Cf Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701-02 (2004) (discussing the
distinction between the Executive Branch intervening on legal grounds versus foreign policy grounds in
the FSIA context). This assumes, of course, that the asserted foreign policy interests are not pretextual.
149. See Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1292-95 (N.D. Cal. 2004). If the court held that
the actions fell under the Act of State doctrine, they would be entitled to considerably greater deference.
See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
150. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1271 (quoting the Statement of Interest).
Deriving Lessons for A TCA from FSIA
appears to be consistent with and pursuant to the unofficial policy of the
national government." 151 The question of whether a public official's act
constituted an official state act is a legal question analogous to querying
whether a foreign sovereign's conduct was non-commercial in nature and thus
subject to immunity under the pre-FSIA standard.
V. RESOLVING THE PROBLEM
A number of scholars have realized the consequences of overly-broad
deference to the Executive Branch in ATCA litigation. In turn, many have
proposed solutions for how to limit deference to the Executive Branch in
ATCA litigation. 152 This Part will address the three main categories of
solutions that have been proposed to date and address why each is unlikely to
succeed. By drawing a comparison to the FSIA, I conclude that legislation is
the strategy most likely to succeed in limiting overly-broad deference to the
Executive Branch. Furthermore, the prospect of passing legislation that limits
deference to the Executive Branch is plausible.
A. Previously Voiced Options for Limiting Deference to the Executive
Scholars who have criticized the degree to which courts defer to the
Executive Branch in ATCA litigation have focused on three options for
resolving the problem.1 53 First, they argue that courts should stop giving as
much deference to the Executive Branch since this judge-created deference is
not appropriate in ATCA claims. Second, they argue that multinational
corporations (MNCs) should self-police their behavior in order to limit the
motivation for ATCA litigation. Finally, some scholars propose an
international regulatory system to hold MNCs responsible for violating the
law of nations. Each of these solutions is unlikely to succeed for reasons
discussed in greater detail below.
1. Stop Deferring
Multiple scholars have argued that globalization has changed the way
that foreign states interact with one another and that strong deference toward
the Executive Branch with regard to cases implicating foreign affairs is no
longer appropriate. One prominent foreign relations law scholar notes that
"[i]ncreasing global interdependence and the dissolution between public and
private international law mean that almost any issue with a foreign element
can now be viewed to 'affect' foreign affairs.... As the categories of 'foreign
relations' . . . expand, the justification for a judicial foreign relations effects
151. Id. at 1293.
152. It is important to note that I am not proposing eliminating deference to the Executive
Branch or even the political question doctrine. This Note only asserts that courts' deference to the
Executive Branch should be checked by Congress when it becomes too broad, as is the case with respect
to the ATCA.
153. Since most individual ATCA defendants are public officials for whom immunity from suit
is relatively less troublesome, see infra Part V (discussing the distinction between public and private
actors), scholars have primarily focused on restricting Executive Branch interference with claims against
multinational corporations.
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test diminishes." 154 Another scholar argues that, as a consequence of
increasing globalization, individual rights should receive greater deference
than concerns about foreign affairs.' 55 An additional argument concedes that
deference to the Executive Branch is still owed when, for example, "a suit
would directly impede national security efforts by the executive during
wartime" but that otherwise, "a court should carefully and independently
examine the assertions of the executive."
'1 56
While these arguments make compelling theoretical assertions, it seems
unlikely that courts will be any less deferential in the near future. In a recent
FSIA case, the Supreme Court noted that "should the State Department choose
to express its opinion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over
particular petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion
might well be entitled to deference . . . ." '57 Given the long history of
deference to the Executive Branch in the realm of foreign affairs,' 58 hoping
that courts will suddenly change the degree of deference afforded in ATCA
cases seems futile.
2. Self-Policing
Another potential solution is to have corporations self-police their
behavior to prevent actions that give rise to ATCA claims. 159 Numerous
efforts have been made to create codes of conduct for multinational
corporations. These efforts began in the 1970s with the drafting of the United
Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, which was never
passed. 60 Since then, individuals have also attempted to formulate corporate
codes of conduct. The most prominent of these was the Sullivan Principles, a
code of conduct prohibiting discrimination by businesses operating in
apartheid South Africa.' 61 Corporations voluntarily pledged compliance to the
Sullivan Principles and reported on their efforts. 16 Congress has also
attempted to intervene, proposing legislation (none of which passed)
containing voluntary corporate codes of conduct for MNCs operating in the
154. Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1413 (1999).
155. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
649, 653 (2002).
156. Lorelle Londis, Comment, The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an Old
Statute Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REv. 141, 196 (2005).
157. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004) (citation omitted).
158. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing the
"delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress").
159. See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human
Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 78 n. 187 (2002) ("The concept of voluntary codes of conduct rests
upon a historical tradition of corporate self-regulation, tracing back to medieval Europe, through to the
beginnings of the U.S. industrial economy.").
160. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Transnational Corps.,
Development and International Economic Co-operation: Transnational Corporations, 2d Sess., Agenda
Item 7(d), at 1, U.N. Doe. E/1990/94 (June 12, 1990).
161. The [Sullivan] Statement of Principles (Fourth Amplification), Nov. 8, 1984, reprinted in
24 I.L.M. 1496 (1985).
162. See Stephens, supra note 159, at 79.
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former Soviet Union and China. 163 More recently, the United Nations Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved the
"Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights." 164 These Norms
"represent a landmark step in holding businesses accountable for their human
rights abuses .... ,165 In part, these Norms are notable because they are non-
voluntary-they call on NGOs to report businesses that are not meeting the
minimum standards of the Norms. 
166
All of these corporate codes of conduct suffer from a lack of
enforceability. Even the most recent Norms require other international
bodies, 167 or states' 68 to enforce their principles. The architect of the Sullivan
Principles later conceded that they were ineffective, "largely because of the
lack of enforcement mechanisms." 169 As shareholders pay more attention to
human rights abuses perpetrated by MNCs, there is some hope that purely
economic incentives, such as shareholder retention, will drive MNCs to self-
enforce these codes of conduct. 170 The recent allegations of abuses in
Myanmar and Colombia, however, 17 1 suggest that these economic incentives
are insufficient to prevent egregious human rights abuses. 172 Without stronger
enforceability mechanisms, the prospect that ATCA litigation will become
obsolete in the face of improved conduct of MNCs seems equally unlikely as
courts limiting their deference.
163. See Slepak Principles Act, S. 1018, 101 st Cong. (1989) (including principles for business
operating in the former Soviet Union to protect Soviet workers). The Slepak Principles Act was based
on a code of conduct developed by a Soviet 6migr6, Vladimir Slepak. See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal
and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human
Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 170 & n.95 (1997); see also H.R. 3489, 102d Cong. (1991)
(proposed code of conduct for businesses operating in China).
164. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Prot. of
Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003)
[hereinafter Norms].
165. David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Current Developments: Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 901, 901 (2003).
166. See id. at 913; see also Norms, supra note 164, at para. 16 (indicating that businesses will
be subject to periodic monitoring that is independent and transparent, and includes input from relevant
stakeholders).
167. See Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 165, at 918 (describing how the ILO, OECD, or
World Bank may adopt the Norms to develop standards on which to measure the conduct of MNCs).
168. Id. at 922 ("[T]he Norms can strengthen the will of governments to insist that businesses
avoid human rights abuses.").
169. See Stephens, supra note 159, at 79 & n.191.
170. See Frey, supra note 163, at 159 & n.28 (1997) (discussing how shareholder
dissatisfaction forced Pepsico to sell a plant in Burma due to protests about its human rights record); see
also Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 165, at 902 ("There is also increasing reason to believe that
greater respect for human rights by companies leads to greater sustainability in emerging markets and
better business performance.") (citations omitted); Simon Chesterman, Oil and Water: Regulating the
Behavior of Multinational Corporations Through Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 307, 328 (2004)
(equating the codes of conduct to marketing tools).
171. See generally supra Section III.B.
172. See, e.g., John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational
Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 496-98 (2000) (describing how Unocal's
alleged abuses in Burma violated its own code of conduct).
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3. International Organization Enforcement
Responding to the lack of enforceability of corporate codes of conduct,
some human rights advocates have championed for enforcement though
international treaties. 173 One possibility is that ATCA-like claims may be
brought in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 174 but the drafting history
of the Rome Statute enacting the ICC suggests that the ICC does not have
jurisdiction over corporations.175 Furthermore, the United States has refused to
sign a variety of international conventions that would have required the
United States to hold MNCs accountable for human rights violations
abroad. 176 This lack of enthusiasm for international regulation spans both
Democratic and Republican administrations. For these reasons, the likelihood
that the United States would enter into a treaty that would subject U.S. MNCs




This Note proposes that the most effective solution to the overly-broad
deference afforded to the Executive Branch is a legislative one. This
conclusion is reached primarily by looking to the pre-FSIA history to see how
pol itical branches responded when they believed too much authority rested
with the Executive Branch in deciding which cases should be dismissed under
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The political branches did not
expect that the Executive Branch would spontaneously decide to apply the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity more objectively, nor did they rely
on foreign sovereigns to police their own conduct, nor did they rely on an
international body to adjudicate and enforce claims against a foreign
sovereign. Rather, Congress and the Executive Branch acted in concert to
place the authority to adjudicate claims authorized by Congress squarely in
the Judicial Branch. By doing so, they reduced the pressure that foreign
governments could place on the Executive Branch, thereby reducing the
173. See generally Borchien Lai, Comment, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Temporary Stopgap
Measure or Permanent Remedy?, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 139, 142 (2005) ("The leaders of the world
and human rights advocates must work together to craft a permanent solution, such as an international
tribunal, instead of placing all their eggs in this porous, fragile basket of the ATCA."); Glen Kelley,
Note, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to Multinational Corporations, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 515, 517-18 & n.201 (2001).
174. See Maurice Nyberg, At Risk from Complicity with Crime, FIN. TIMEs, July 28, 1998, at 15
(warning "[c]ommercial lawyers" that the ICC treaty "could create international criminal liability for
employers, officers and directors of corporations.").
175. Chesterman, supra note 170, at 327-28 (discussing how the drafters specifically declined
to include liability for "legal persons," suggesting that corporate liability is unlikely).
176. See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It-And Why the United States Shouldn't: The United
States' International Obligation To Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad,
II DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 395,422-25 (1999) (enumerating the international conventions pertaining to human
rights violations to which the United States has failed to become a signatory).
177. See RAYMOND J. WALDMANN, REGULATING BusiNEss THROUGH CODES OF CONDUCT 6
(1980) ("It is generally agreed that there is little likelihood that MNCs will be subject to the authority of
a comprehensive international regulatory organization in the near future.")
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foreign policy implications of the State Department's decisions,' 78 and they
further ensured that litigants whose claims were entitled to a day in court
received such an opportunity.179 A similar intervention could take place with
respect to the ATCA. By detailing when ATCA liability should exist,
Congress will remove pressure from the Executive Branch as to the foreign
policy implications of ATCA litigation and will encourage courts to make
legal determinations as to when ATCA litigation should proceed rather than
defer to a decision by the Executive Branch.
A legislative solution is also preferable because it retains questions
pertaining to foreign affairs in a political branch. While deference in foreign
affairs often focuses on the Executive Branch, 180 Congress also has an
important role.' 81 As one scholar notes, Congress "plays a largely reactive role
in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, exercising the most influence when
the qualities of legislation (public deliberation, relative immutability,
comprehensiveness, and democratic legitimacy) are most appropriate."' 82 The
solution for the problem of overly-broad deference would ideally be a
comprehensive solution demanding significant deliberation and expertise in
foreign affairs, which the Judicial Branch lacks.
While the prospect for legislation sympathetic to ATCA claims is dim
under the Bush Administration, future intervention is possible. This too is
similar to the FSIA, which was passed at the request of the Executive Branch
and would not have been passed without the approval of a sympathetic
Congress. Congress and the President have repeatedly shown their willingness
to pass and sign legislation that places liability on corporate behavior outside
U.S. borders. The most prominent of these is the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA), passed in 1977, and amended most recently in 1998, which
prohibits corporations and their employees from bribing foreign officials.'
83
The FCPA is not dissimilar from the ATCA in that they both are aimed at
stopping behavior that harms the image of the United States abroad. 184
Furthermore, in order to pass the FCPA, the Congress and the President likely
had to overcome opposition from the business community. Congress has also
178. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976) ("A principal purpose of this bill [establishing
FSIA] is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial
branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations ....").
179. Following the passage of the FSIA, it seems that the Executive Branch submits Statements
of Interest only when the case implicates U.S. treaty obligations. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 305 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Anderman v. Fed. Rep. of Austria, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (executive agreement).
180. See supra note 82.
181. See, e.g., the FSIA, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (1976) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-11)(2000).
182. Goldsmith, supra note 154, at 1398.
183. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), amended by
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, § 5003(c), 102 Stat.
1107, 1419 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2).
184. See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977) (describing the need for the FCPA, the Senate Report
declared that "[t]he image of American democracy abroad has been tarnished."); see also WALLACE L.
TIMMENY & ROBERT B. VON MEHREN, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: THREE YEARS AFTER
PASSAGE 13 (1981) ("The legislative history reflects that a primary concern of Congress was the damage
that such payments has [sic] caused to American relations with foreign nations in critical areas of the
world."); S. REP. No. 102-249 (1991) (Conf. Rep.) (praising the ATCA for providing a cause of action
against nearly universally condemned offenses).
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been willing to pass legislation to protect human rights abroad, for example by
passing the Torture Victim Protection Act in 1994.185 In addition, in 2005,
Senator Feinstein proposed amending the ATCA, 186 but ended up withdrawing
her bill from consideration just one week after she offered it, due in part to
strong opposition from human rights groups. 87 History shows that Congress
has the ability and interest to pass legislation holding individuals and
corporations accountable for their actions overseas. Congress is also well
aware of the ATCA and has recently tried to amend it. Therefore, if a
President and Congress agree that articulating ATCA claims more clearly will
reduce the foreign policy implications of the Act and dissuade the State
Department from requesting effective immunity for violators of the law of
nations, it seems feasible that Congress could enact a FSIA-like solution for
the ATCA.
VI. POSSIBLE STAUTORY PROVISIONS
Determining what provisions should be included in any legislative
solution requires analysis beyond the scope of this Note. This Part suggests
two areas for potential legislation solely to provide a more concrete example
of how a legislative solution may reduce the broad deference currently granted
to the Executive Branch. First, Congress could differentiate between ATCA
defendants who are private actors versus public officials. Second, Congress
could explicitly state when the concerns of the Executive Branch regarding
U.S. foreign policy are most relevant.
1. Public/Private Distinction
One of the most troubling consequences of Executive Branch deference
that Congress could remedy is the effective immunity granted to private
actors. While holding foreign public officials liable in U.S. courts invites
obvious foreign policy concerns, it is unclear why private actors, often acting
in a commercial capacity, should have immunity for violations of the law of
nations. 188 Even if the offending corporation, for example, worked closely
with a foreign government, Congress could decide that a condition of
operating in the United States (sufficient to constitute minimum contacts to
obtain personal jurisdiction1 89), is that companies will be held accountable for
violating the law of nations. Such a condition would not be unreasonable,
especially when compared to the prohibition against bribing foreign
officials.' 90 As the district court in Talisman Energy, Inc. eloquently stated:
185. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (Supp. V 1993)) (subjecting individuals to civil damages for the torture or
extrajudicial killing of any individual, U.S. citizen or alien, under the actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation).
186. See S. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005), 151 CONG. REc. S 11423, 11433 (2005).
187. See Eliza Strickland, Was DiFi Batting for Big Oil?, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Nov. 9, 2005)
(describing the opposition). The content of the bill will be described in further detail in Part VI, infra.
188. See supra Section lII.A.
189. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 103 (1987) (discussing what
constitutes minimum contacts).
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2000) (codification of the FCPA).
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[T]he United States and the international community retain a compelling interest in the
application of the international law proscribing atrocities such as genocide and crimes
against humanity. To the extent that . Talisman's arguments request this Court in its
discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction over past events in order to avoid conflict
with future Canadian foreign policy, the seriousness of the alleged past events counsel in
favor of exercising jurisdiction.
1 9 1
Congress may decide that the Executive Branch's opinion is more
relevant when foreign public officials are sued under the ATCA. Concerns
about having U.S. officials being held liable in foreign countries as well as the
relationship with the country of the allegedly offending officials suggests a
greater chance that U.S. foreign policy interests may be closely related to the
case. Congress may therefore grant a more deferential standard for
determining when a public official's acts constitute official acts of state and
therefore deserve immunity under the Act of State doctrine. Congress may
decide, on the other hand, that any individual who violates the law of nations,
regardless of whether he or she is a public official, should be held
accountable. In 1964, Congress enacted analogous legislation in response to a
Supreme Court case where the Court refused, under the Act of State Doctrine,
to consider the expropriation of land within Cuba by the Cuban
government.192 In response, Congress passed the Hickenlooper Amendment,
which stated that courts should not consider an expropriation by a foreign
state an official act under the Act of State doctrine. 193 Congress could pass
similar legislation declaring that violations of the law of nations, including
acts committed by foreign public officials, cannot be protected under the Act
of State doctrine.
2. Executive Deference
Congress may also attempt to limit Executive deference by explicitly
stating when courts should consider the input of the Executive Branch. Certain
circumstances are likely to implicate foreign affairs, and the input of the
Executive Branch in such circumstances may be more helpful for the court.
For example, courts have historically deferred to the Executive Branch when
the State Department reports that a certain holding by the court would violate
our international treaty obligations. 194 In one case previously discussed, the
court dismissed a claim since it would seem to infringe on a treaty signed
between two foreign countries (Japan and South Korea) following World War
1I. 195 Even when treaty obligations are not involved, other international
obligations could warrant Executive Branch input. 196 Finally, as discussed
191. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882 (DLC), 2004
WL 1920978, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004).
192. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
193. See Hickenlooper Amendment, Pub. L. No. 88-633, 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1964) (codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (2000)) [hereinafter Hickenlooper Amendment].
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above, Congress may decide that special deference is appropriate when the
claim involves a public official of a foreign government.
Senator Feinstein's 2005 proposed bill to reform the ATCA instructed
courts on when to consider Executive Branch input. Unfortunately, the bill
instructed courts to grant the Executive Branch the broad deference this Note
militates against: "No court ... shall proceed in considering the merits of a
claim under [ATCA] if the President, or a designee of the President,
adequately certifies to the court in writing that such exercise of jurisdiction
will have a negative impact on the foreign policy interests of the United
States."' 97 The proposed bill, however, indicates that Congress is willing to
instruct courts as to when they should consider Executive Branch input.' 98 An
added benefit of restricting the role of the Executive Branch, as the drafters of
the FSIA realized, is that as authority is vested in a non-political branch (i.e.
the Judicial Branch), the foreign policy implications of immunity decisions
are actually reduced. 199 Therefore, excluding the State Department from
certain aspects of ATCA claims mitigates the damage to U.S. foreign policy
interests caused by making decisions adverse to foreign parties. In the case of
the ATCA, Congress should exercise its authority to limit the broad deference
200
currently granted to the Executive Branch.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Executive Branch will continue to play a critical role in U.S. foreign
affairs. At times, it may be appropriate for the State Department to intervene
to request that a court dismiss an ATCA claim when proceeding would violate
U.S. treaty obligations or seriously harm U.S. foreign policy interests. When
Congress, however, through a deliberative process codifies a cause of action,
including those that apply extraterritorially, courts should give pause before
immediately dismissing a potentially valid claim under the political question
doctrine. Should the courts grant too much deference to the Executive Branch,
as this Note has demonstrated occurred with respect to the ATCA, Congress
should respond. The problem may be a structural one in that the Executive
Branch feels compelled to intervene based on political pressures from foreign
governments or domestic corporations and, as in the case of the FSIA, a
willing Executive Branch would gladly transfer the authority to make such
determinations over to the courts. Thoughtful Congressional intervention will
help courts apply the ATCA more consistently across defendants and will help
ensure that victims of violations of the law of nations will receive the due
process they deserve.
197. S. 1874, 109th Cong. § 1350(e) (2005).
198. Cf Hickenlooper Amendment, supra note 193. Note, however, that the Hickenlooper
Amendment allows the court to apply the Act of State doctrine if the President determines that
application of the doctrine is "required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States." Id.
199. See supra note 178.
200. Should Congress elect to act with regard to ATCA, there are a number of other aspects of
the ATCA unrelated to Executive Branch deference that scholars believe Congress should clarify. See,
e.g., Christensen, supra note 6, at 1257-65 (discussing the need to better define the standards for aiding
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